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Abstract
Both the ethics of autonomous systems and the problems of their
technical implementation have by now been studied in some detail.
Less attention has been given to the areas in which these two separate
concerns meet. This paper, written by both philosophers and engi-
neers of autonomous systems, addresses a number of issues in machine
ethics that are located at precisely the intersection between ethics and
engineering. We first discuss the main challenges which, in our view,
machine ethics posses to moral philosophy. We them consider differ-
ent approaches towards the conceptual design of autonomous systems
and their implications on the ethics implementation in such systems.
Then we examine problematic areas regarding the specification and
verification of ethical behavior in autonomous systems, particularly
with a view towards the requirements of future legislation. We discuss
transparency and accountability issues that will be crucial for any fu-
ture wide deployment of autonomous systems in society. Finally we
consider the, often overlooked, possibility of intentional misuse of AI
systems and the possible dangers arising out of deliberately unethical
design, implementation, and use of autonomous robots.
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1 Introduction
The so called “trolley problem” is a thought experiment introduced in Foot
[1967], whose ethical conundrum continues to fascinate today Wallach and
Allen [2008]. Roughly, it can be summarized as follows: there is a runaway
trolley on a railroad track and ahead on the track there are five people tied
up, unable to escape being killed by the trolley. The track splits in two by
a lever you control. The lever can divert the trolley on to a second track
where there is one person tied up and unable to move. Is it more ethical to
divert the train, or let it run its course?
The emergence of driver-less cars in regular traffic has brought the trolley
problem to public attention. Articles such as “Should Your Car Kill You
To Save Others?”1 are flooding popular science media. It is easy, given the
same problem context of traffic, to get sidetracked into confusing solving
the trolley problem with controlling the impact driver-less cars will have
on traffic and our society as a whole. This, of course, is not the case.
Enabling machines to exhibit ethical behavior is a very complex and very
real time-sensitive issue. The driver-less cars are only the forefront of a
whole generation of intelligent systems that can operate autonomously and
will operate as part of our society. Which ethical theory to employ for
deciding whose death to avoid in a difficult traffic situation is a difficult
problem. This, however is not necessarily the most important problem we
would need to solve. The goal of this position paper is to discuss what
does engineering machine ethics entail. Once we as a society have discerned
what is the right thing for an artificial autonomous system to do, how can
we make sure the machine does it?
The problem of identifying, discerning, and recommending concepts of
right and wrong is the domain of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy, to-
gether with the law, act as a system of recommendations regarding which
1http://www.popularmechanics.com/cars/a21492/the-self-driving-dilemma/
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possible actions are to be considered right or wrong (ignoring, for the mo-
ment, ethics systems that do not specifically address the morality of indi-
vidual actions, e.g. character-based ethics, and which are less useful for the
problem at hand).
Driver-less vehicles are the most visible of a whole range of technolo-
gies. This range includes also the assisted living technologies, as well as
the various embedded decision aid software and solutions. We have been
using intelligent systems with varying degree of autonomy for the past fifty
years: industrial robots, intelligent programming of household appliances,
automated trains, etc. However, what all of these machines have in com-
mon is that they either operate in a segregated space, a so called working
envelope, or they have no capabilities to cause damage to their environment.
Driver-less vehicles are obviously going to “break” both these restrictions.
How can we build intelligent autonomous systems that uphold the ethical
values of the society in which they are embedded? This is the main concern
of machine ethics, a new interdisciplinary area of research within Artifi-
cial Intelligence (AI) Moor [2006]; Allen et al. [2006]; Wallach et al. [2008];
Wallach and Allen [2008]; Anderson et al. [2016].
It is clear that choosing the best moral theory to implement in a partic-
ular intelligent autonomous system is not a simple question. It is primarily
a question for moral philosophy and opens new challenges in this field. In
Section 2 we give a brief overview of these challenges.
For a long time, people and societies have been the only intelligent
decision-makers. Moral philosophy has been developed with the often im-
plicit assumption that the moral agent is a human. It is not at all clear to
what extent existing moral theories extend to non-human decision-makers.
Even if it is shown to be easy to replace a human agent with an artifi-
cial agent in a moral theory, and some societal decision is made concerning
which ethical behavior in machines is desirable or sufficient, we are still faced
with a set of problems regarding the implementation of ethical reasoning.
These are the problems we analyze here: implementation, verification, trust,
confidence and transparency and the prevention of intentionally unethical
systems.
Moral theories are inherently ambiguous in recommendations of moral
behavior, thus reflecting the context dependency of what constitutes a moral
choice. We already know that artificial systems, when compared to people,
are not good at handling ambiguity. Enabling machines to deal with context-
ambiguity in decision-making is a core Artificial Intelligence problem Russell
and Norvig [2015]. In Section 3 we give an overview of the most intuitive
approaches to implementing ethical behavior in autonomous systems and
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discuss the advantages and shortcomings of these approaches.
Human societies have a multitude of means for ensuring its members
behave within the socially accepted boundaries of morality. We can say
that a person behaves ethically because they have an individual and personal
motivation to do so, without going into how this motivation is formed. The
motivation for an artificial agent to behave ethically originates not personally
from the agent, but from other actors. These actors can broadly be organized
intro three groups: the designers of the artificial agent, its users, and the
various societal regulators whose job it is to make sure that order in society
is maintained. It is all of these actors that need to be reassured that their
own particular motivations for the AI system to behave ethically are met.
Hence, a big concern when engineering machine ethics is not only that ethical
behavior is accomplished, but also that the ethical behavior can be verified.
This is the issue we discuss in Section 4.
In Section 5 we focus on issues of transparency and accountability for
machine ethics implementations. Since there are several actors outside of
the ethical agent who are supplying the motivation for ethical behavior, the
implementation of this behavior must be transparent to those actors to the
extent and in a manner sufficient for their needs. Transparency is a key
element in enabling society to have the right amount of trust and confidence
in the operations of an AI system.
Lastly in Section 6 we discuss the possible dangers for society that lie
in engineering machine ethics. Like all technology, AI systems can also be
abused to further criminal activities. AI systems can be deliberately built to
behave unethically and illegally, but they also can be induced, deliberately
or by accident, into exhibiting socially undesirable behavior.
The main contribution of this position paper is an integral overview of
the immediate challenges and open questions faced when pursuing the prob-
lem of engineering of machine ethics. This paper is a result of a week long
discussion among experts of different fields within the scope of the Dagstuhl
Seminar 162222, and incorporates various ideas that arose as a result of
discussions among interdisciplinary experts. Position papers that focus on
machine ethics as a whole have been produced and they offer interesting in-
sights in the problem as a whole, see for example Moor [2006]; Anderson and
Leigh Anderson [2007]; Bonnefon et al. [2016]; Anderson et al. [2016], but
to the best of our knowledge, this is the only document devoted specifically
to the problem of engineering machine ethics.
2The report on this seminar is available Fisher et al. [2016].
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2 Challenges for Machine Moral Philosophy
Normative ethics is the branch of moral philosophy concerned with develop-
ing methods for deciding how one aught to act. The purpose of devising a
moral theory, within normative ethics, is to develop a consistent and coher-
ent system that can be followed to unambiguously identify an action as good
or bad. Numerous specific theories have been developed, the most notable
of which are perhaps utilitarianism Harsanyi [1977], Kantianism Ellington
[1993], and Ross’s ethical theory Ross [1930].
All of the moral theories so far developed in philosophy have been built
around several underlying assumptions. First and foremost is the assump-
tion that the reasoning and decision making when following the moral theory
is done by an agent that is a human. The immediate specific question we
can pose to moral philosophy is: given a specific normative moral theory,
how is the theory affected if an artificial agent replaces a human agent in it?
A more subtle assumption in normative ethics is the assumption that the
agent has de facto the ability of being a moral agent. This means that the
theory is developed for a being that is capable of understanding concepts
of right and wrong. The debate of whether an artificially created entity
can be a moral agent is still far from settled Etzioni and Etzioni [2017].
Wallach and Allen [Wallach and Allen, 2008, Chapter 2] hint at the idea
that how ethically sensitive an artificial system can be depends on how able
of autonomous action it is. At this point in the development of the field of
machine ethics it is fair to summarise that the capacity for moral agency of
an artificial system is more of a sliding scale rather than a Boolean value.
There are at least two questions to moral philosophy we can pose. The first
is: how to define a scale of moral agency to describe the moral abilities
of current and future artificial agents. The second question again is about
going back to specific normative moral theories and checking how the theory
is affected by replacing a full moral agent with an agent that is “lower” on the
newly devised moral agency scale. Perhaps the concept of moral agency is
altogether inadequate when discussing autonomous intelligent systems and
a new concept needs to be devised.
There is a further weaker assumption in normative ethics, which is the
assumption that the agents of the theory are able to accept and act upon
considered judgements Elgin [1996]. Consider judgments are “common sense
agreements” about what is good or bad in particular instances or cases. For
example, the idea that murder is bad except in exceptional circumstances,
is a considered judgment. This, let us call it considered judgment ability
assumption, is reflected in the numerous moral dilemmas encountered in
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the normative ethics literature, the trolly problem being the most popular
example.
A dilemma in normative ethics, understood in a very broad sense, is
a problem of choosing between two options each of which violating one or
more considered judgment. An artificial agent does not possess a common
sense understanding unless one is programmed into him. The engineering
of common sense, or rather background knowledge, has been a notoriously
elusive problem in artificial intelligence. The dilemmas we encounter in
machine ethics reflect this. Consider for example the so called Cake or
Death problem introduced in Armstrong [2015] which describes a situation
in which an agent is unsure if if killing people is ethical or baking them a
nice cake is ethical.
Solving Cake or Death is not an ethical problem in moral philosophy,
it is trivial. However, the question of which are the essential considered
judgments that necessarily have to be implemented in machines is not a
trivial problem. This would depend on the nature and abilities of a specific
class of artificial agents. In contrast to focussing on a general theory of
discerning right from wrong, there is a need for normative ethics to identify
and develop a minimal such theory.
Building moral machines by implementing human morality is a natural
approach. After all, it is human society that those machine are entering
and it is human sensibilities and values that they have to uphold. An alter-
native, or perhaps parallel approach would be to build a normative ethics
theory exclusively for artificial agent. An example of such a theory comes
to us from science fiction - the three laws of robotics of Prof. Isaak Asimov
Asimov [1950]. The shortcomings of Asimov’s laws of robotics have been
extensively argued by the author himself, but they have also been given
a serious philosophical consideration Leigh Anderson [2008] and attempts
have been made for their implementation Dennis et al. [2015]; Vanderelst
and Winfield [2017]; Caycedo Alvarez et al. [2017].
The development of machine moral theory is an interesting open area
for study in normative ethics. The question that has to be addressed first
perhaps is what constitutes a viable, desirable, or good theory for artificial
agents? We are perhaps primed by the cultural influence of Asimov’s laws
of robotics to ask: what is it that a robot should never do? But thinking
in absolutes is not likely to be viable for machine moral theories any more
than it is viable for human normative ethics. Regardless of what comes our
of normative ethics in the future, any moral theory developed for artificial
agents must be developed to the point of being implementable. Prescrip-
tions of good behaviour suffice for people, for machines we need algorithms.
6
An algorithm necessarily includes a specification of all possible scenarios
and context in which an ethical decision can be made. Therefore it is nec-
essary that machine normative ethicists, computer scientists and engineers
collaborate closely towards developing machine moral philosophy, with this
collaboration perhaps being one of the challenges as well.
3 Different Approaches, their Advantages and Chal-
lenges
An intelligent system is one that is capable of communicating with, and
reasoning about, its environment and other systems. An autonomous system
is one that is capable of, to a certain extent, unsupervised operation and
decision-making. Wallach, Allen, and Smit Wallach et al. [2008]; Wallach
and Allen [2008] argue that very intuitively, ethical behavior in machines
can be accomplished in at least two different ways. The first approach is to
identify a set of ethical rules, perhaps by choosing a normative ethic theory,
around which a decision-making algorithm can be implemented. The second
approach is to have a machine evolve or “learn” to discern right from wrong
without it having be explicitly guided by any one ethic theory. They refer to
these two approaches as the top-down and bottom-up approach respectively.
A hybrid approach in their sense is one in which an agent starts with a set
of rules or values and modifies them into a system for discerning right from
wrong.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has grown into a large field that incorporates
many approaches, which can be, very tentatively, classified into soft com-
puting approaches, which include statistical methods, machine learning and
probabilistic reasoning, and traditional symbolic AI methods, which includes
logic-based reasoning Russell and Norvig [2015]. The question of how to
implement machine ethics in an intelligent autonomous system necessarily
hinges on the AI methods that system uses. Different AI approaches would
be subject to different machine ethics implementations and we need to con-
sider their malleability to machine ethic approaches, as well as their risks
and advantages in this respect.
We here roughly classify the current and future machine ethics imple-
mentations based on the main AI approach used into soft machine ethics
and symbolic machine ethics mirroring the two largest traditional branches
of AI methodology. We discuss both of these approaches and their advan-
tages and challenges. We should note at this point that a hybrid approach
here would be one that combines symbolic methods, such as for example rule
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based reasoning, with soft methods such as for example supervised learning.
The bottom-up approach of Wallach et al. [2008]; Wallach and Allen
[2008] naturally lends itself to be approached by using soft computing AI
methods, whereas their top-down approach is perhaps best “served” by sym-
bolic AI methods.
3.1 Soft and Symbolic AI Methods for machine ethics
Within engineering, a top-down approach towards solving a task consists in
breaking down the task iteratively into smaller sub-tasks until one obtains
tasks that can be directly implemented. Problems best solvable by a top-
down approach are ones in which the problem, and its context, are fully
understood and can be formally specified. This is normally the case when
the problem occurs in a controlled environment. These problem properties
are also ones required for a successful solution by implementation using
symbolic AI methods such as rule based reasoning.
There are numerous ways in which a symbolic AI approach can be taken
to develop ethical behaviour in a system. The most frequent in the literature
is to constrain the choices of the system using rules derived from an ethical
theory. This is the approach taken in Arkin et al. [2012], for developing
the concept of ethical governor, and also in Dennis et al. [2016b] where the
ethical theory used is a version of Ross’s ethical theory Ross [1930]. The
Dennis et al. [2016b] work considers a hybrid autonomous system three-layer
architecture: a continuous system controlled by a rational software agent,
which makes discrete decisions, via a continuous control layer that allows
for a dynamic environment interaction and feedback. The rational software
agent is provided with an ethical policy, a total order over abstract ethical
principles such as “do no harm”, “do not damage property” etc. The agent
relies on external entities to identify if, and which, of her possible actions
impinges on some of these abstract ethical principles. Having her actions
annotated, the agent chooses between possible actions by selecting the one
that is minimally unethical with respect to the given ethical policy. In
contrast, Bendel [2016] proposes a method for building annotated decision
trees for making simple ethical choices.
A bottom-up approach to problem solving in engineering starts with de-
scribing instances of desired solutions by using adequate parameters and
the proceeding to build up a procedure for identifying solutions based on
these parameters. Machine learning methods in AI take a bottom-up ap-
proach to problem solving. There are several examples of using machine
learning to implement machine ethics, such as for example Anderson and
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Anderson [2014] andAbel et al. [2016]. In Anderson and Anderson [2014]
inductive logic programming is used over a corpus of particular cases of
ethical dilemma to discover ethical preference principles. Each case relates
two actions, one more ethical than the other. The preference between the
actions depends on ethically relevant features that actions involve such as
harm, benefit, respect for autonomy, etc. Each feature is represented as an
integer that specifies the degree of its presence (positive value) or absence
(negative value) in a given action. The system is able to extract an ethical
rule from the cases it is presented with and thus to a certain extent is able to
learn to discern right from wrong. In Abel et al. [2016] reinforcement learn-
ing is used to learn what the most moral of two actions is, by rewarding the
“correct” decisions an agent makes and “punishing” the bad “wrong” ones.
Whether a soft or symbolic AI method is used depends on the nature
of the problem that needs to be solved. The two families of methods tackle
problem from different sides and are not mutually exclusive. Each of the
methods comes with its own advantages and challenges with respect to build-
ing ethical behaviour in an intelligent autonomous system.
3.2 Advantages and challenges of using Symbolic AI Meth-
ods
Symbolic AI methods are best suited for ethical reasoning in limited domains
when the context of the decision-making problems can be predicted. To use
symbolic based reasoning, an ethical theory needs to chosen before construct-
ing and deploying the system and this theory does not change throughout
the system’s usage. This allows for a thorough and well-informed process of
decision-making and the verification of the system prior its practical appli-
cation. Different ethical principles and theories may explicitly be encoded
into the system giving clear options to decide upon. Any parameters that
are left open for definition by the customer or to be learned from interaction
with the environment have a clear function and it is possible to verify that
they do not violate more general ethical principles.
Symbolic AI methods also come with their set of challenges and limita-
tions. General ethical guidelines are typically formulated on a very abstract
level. Much philosophical discourse on ethics is concerned with problems
occurring when applying such general guidelines to concrete situations. It
is thus not clear if, and how, general ethical guidelines can be leveraged to
solve concrete problems of decision making in practice. For a real-world sys-
tem the connection to the non-discrete sensory-motor level must be made.
There are many ways to transform continuous sensor values into discrete
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propositions that can be used in reasoning. General guidelines or even sin-
gle terms and concepts are only (if at all) implementable in a reduced way,
i.e. restricted to one preferably clear interpretation. Due to their context
sensitive definition it is not possible to consider every possible interpretation
of an abstract guideline or term in implementing them in an artificial system
Matthias [2011].
Furthermore, symbolic AI approaches risk conflicts between the imple-
mented ethical theories and principles. If only one theory is implemented,
e.g. Kant’s Categorical Imperative Ellington [1993] or Isaac Asimov’s first
Law of Robotics3, then this theory would determine the specific maxims that
are to be defined situationally by the artificial system. Winfield Winfield et
al. [2014] describes experimental trials of a minimally ethical robot which
implements Asimov’s three laws of robotics. The chosen theory must be
such as to allow implementable rules to be derived from it. Such a monistic
approach assumes that there exist no moral dilemmas, i.e. that the imple-
mented theory is able to give a conflict-free rule to make a decision in every
context (Winfield et al. [2014] experimentally shows how a single ethical rule
performs when faced with a balanced ethical dilemma).
Deciding on a specific set of ethical principles involves settling long-
standing philosophical disputes in an ad-hoc way. It is possible that govern-
mental bodies might take the lead in outlining high-level ethical guidance
to designers. For example, Germany’s ministry of transport recently an-
nounced the intention to set out a basic ethical policy to be followed by car
designers stipulating that property damage takes always precedence over
personal injury, that there must be no classification of people, for example,
on size, age and the like, and that – ultimately – it is the manufacturer who
is liable4.
Symbolic AI approaches require that any kind of “common sense” is
explicitly coded using the formal language of the method. This severely
impacts the scalability of the machine ethics solution. As it is well under-
stood in the AI sub-discipline of knowledge representation and reasoning,
the more expressive the formal language for encoding knowledge is, the more
computationally expensive reasoning becomes. It is not a problem of having
or symbolically encoding a large amount of information, but a problem of
computing logical entailment or consistency, which are in the core of deep
reasoning and are known to be of non-deterministic computational com-
3The laws can be found quoted in Wikipedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Three_Laws_of_Robotics
4http://www.wiwo.de/politik/europa/selbstfahrende-autos-dobrindt-
gruendet-ethikkommission-fuer-automatisiertes-fahren/14513384.html
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plexity. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the most recent major AI break-
throughs have been achieved using statistical processing of information and
shallow reasoning. That being said, some symbolic-methods, such as model
checking, are scalable within reasonable parameters, and have been vastly
deployed in the information processing industry.
3.3 Advantages and challenges of using Soft AI Methods
Soft AI methods are best applicable when we know the kind of data the AI
system receives from interacting with the environment and, while the overall
objective might not be well known or specified, we still have an idea how
to process these data in a useful manner. For instance, the vision pipeline
of a household robot is designed to extract obstacles (walls, tables, etc.),
objects of interest (books on a shelf etc.), and its own position from the
sensory data because this information is useful for a wide range of tasks
it will be required to perform. Most real-world AI systems will be partly
designed using a soft AI method at least on the lower sensory-motor level.
Because soft AI methods are based on synthesis of actions and choices, with
respect to the task of building an ethical AI the major question here is: how
do components designed in a bottom-up fashion affect the overall ethical
properties of the system?
Soft AI methods do not require predetermines moral principles , ethical
theories or sets of rules, but instead formulate basal parameters and intend
to implement competences whereby an artificial system acts autonomously.
This can be done, for example, via trial and error or other modes of learning
such as imitation, induction and deduction, exploration, learning through
reward, association and conditioning Cangelosi and Schlesinger [2014]. Soft
AI methods can be separated into models of evolution Froese and Di Paolo
[2010] and models of human socialization Fong et al. [2003]; Breazeal and
Scassellati [2002]. The former simulate evolutionary moral learning, by as-
sessing slightly different programs in an artificial system to evaluate an eth-
ical case. Those programs that can solve the ethical task sufficiently go
through to a “next round” where they are (re)combined to solve further
ethical tasks. Evolutionary approaches can be used in earlier stages of moral
development before considering models of human socialization.
Models of human socialization consider the role of empathy and emotion
for moral learning. They assume that a robot learns morality via empa-
thy Slote [2007]. What is controversial in the philosophical discourse is
that there exist two types of empathy Stu¨eber [2006]: perceptual empathy,
when an emotion triggers an equivalent or congruent reaction in the ob-
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server Misselhorn [2009], and imaginative empathy that requires a change
in perspective in the form of empathising with the other, putting oneself
in the observed other’s shoes. Perceptual empathy is explicable with the
help of specific theories of mind or neuronal resonance and mirror neurons
and has been implemented in a rudimentary fashion in artificial systems
Balconi and Bortolotti [2012]; Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro [2008]; Mataric
[2000]. Ekman Ekman [1992] implements perceptual empathy in the form
of a basal affect program as an autonomous reaction scheme as a route to
the implementation of morality in robots. Young children and chimpanzees
are equipped with this fundamental form of empathy which forms the ba-
sis for pre-social behavior Warneken and Tomasello [2009]; Hoffman [2001].
Imaginative empathy is much more complex and develops on the basis of
perceptual empathy only. It is exhibited only in human socialisation, not
in non-human primates. This form of empathy is cognitively more ambi-
tious and is involved in more complex moral reasoning and acting Gallagher
[2012]. We are not aware of any attempt to implement imaginative empathy
in artificial systems.
Since, by means of a soft AI solution the AI system becomes a moral
agent (if only in the narrowest sense of the word) one might ask whether it is
likely to be more adaptable to making ethical choices in situations that are
not pre-determined (which is a strong limitation to using the symbolic AI
methods). Since the system learns its own ethical rules, it circumvents, to an
extent (one could argue), the need to choose one particular ethical theory
to implement. But this seems at least questionable. Every self-learning
system must still be configured to pay attention to particular features of the
data set, and to ignore others. Looking at the consequences of an action,
instead of the agent’s motivation (for example) is such a choice of features
that essentially determines the choice of moral theory. It seems difficult to
judge at this point whether we can hope to create ethical-theory-agnostic
AI systems, since every choice of relevant data features is already, to some
extent, a choice of moral theory.
A major challenge with using soft AI methods is that it is hard to certify
whether the system fulfils any requirements one might want to impose. In-
deed this is a challenge for all machine learning systems. A machine learning
solution virtually behaves as a black box - the approach solves a problem
successfully most of the time, but it is unclear whether a solution can be
expected for sure, or why a particular solution was learned or developed for
a particular problem. Soft AI methods, and machine learning in particular,
have had a dramatic success recently, with machine learning methods be-
ing used in a variety of problems and contexts. This success has prompted
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for calls to ensure that some level of explainability for the choices of the
system is required, which in turn have given rise for the Explainable AI
(XAI) DARPA programme 5. In Anderson and Leigh Anderson [2015] we
find one of the earliest specific implementations of XAI in machine ethics.
Their system extracts a moral rule from a collection of cases and is able to
explain why a particular decision is identified as more ethical referring to
the learning data.
Nonetheless, the black box nature of soft AI methods is likely to mean
that these solutions are unsuitable for implementation in critical systems.
This fundamental problem occurs irrespective of whether the ethical system
itself or only low-level sub-systems are built using a soft AI solution.
3.4 Modular and Hybrid approaches
Both the soft and symbolic AI methods come with advantages and chal-
lenges, but they also can complement each-other. A system is an entity
comprised of several entities, thus in principle an AI system can be built us-
ing components that exploit both solution approaches. We are unaware of
any implemented hybrid ethical reasoning system6, but we can very briefly
discuss some recommendations for how such a system can be created.
One approach would be to separate decision-making by the ethical prin-
ciples it involves. For example, decisions involving the possibility of human
death should be made using a pre-programmed ethical policy, while deci-
sions involving violation of autonomy can be based on ethical preferences
learned through interaction with the system’s owner. Another approach
would be to separate decision-making in different contexts, with soft AI
methods being allowed as the default ethical decision-making method, while
symbolic AI approaches being required to be implemented for certain spe-
cific pre-determined contexts. Alternatively a system can be designed so
it first learns to recognize the ethical implications of its actions and then
those implications can be used to follow an implemented ethical theory when
choosing some specific course of action.
Implementing ethical reasoning within a system is not sufficient, we must
execute such implementation in a way that allows for verification of the
quality of the resulting ethical behavior. The designers and manufacturers
5https://www.darpa.mil/program/explainable-artificial-intelligence
6 Although the title of van Rysewyk and Pontier [2015] claims a hybrid implemented
system upon closer inspection it is not clear in which sense is the solution not a pure
bottom-up approach in the sense of Wallach and Allen [2008], while the authors themselves
do not offer an analysis of this type in their paper.
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of AI systems necessarily have to offer reasons for their users to trust the
artificial ethical system, and they also need to foresee possible malfunctions
and provide means to deal with them.
4 Specification and Verification of Ethical Behav-
ior
Within our society, entities that are in a position to do us harm, be it
a complex machine production tool, the surgeon operating on our uncon-
scious body, the other drivers on the highway, or a chainsaw, are subject
to licensing and certification. Certification informs consumers and experts
of the properties of a product, a system, or a person in a position of re-
sponsibility. Knowing that a standard has been met allows individuals to
have confidence in using machinery and to trust the decisions and actions of
professionals. Tools and systems are certified to operate within designated
parameters, while under (well defined) proper care. Certification confirms
that the manufacturer has taken all steps necessary to avoid or minimize
foreseeable risks that arise in relation to the usage of the tool. Certification
for persons in position of responsibility is more complex because it involves
a (possibly continuous) examination to demonstrate that the certified per-
son has the understanding and skills necessary to perform his/her duties.
Typically, this involves regulations prescribing expected behavior — often,
humans must pass an examination concerning these regulations. Once we
move to an autonomous system, with no human directly in control, what are
our means to ensure that a systems actually matches the relevant criteria?
In order to be confident in a system’s behavior we need to specify what
we can expect the system to do in a particular circumstance, verify that
the system does actually achieve this, and validate that our requirements
are actually what the end-users want. There exist a vast range of differ-
ent techniques, for example developed over many years within the field of
Software Engineering Sommerville [2001]. These techniques range from the
formal, such as proof, through structured, such as testing, to informal, such
as user validation. All these approaches can, in principle, be applied across
the range of autonomous systems, including robotics Fisher et al. [2013].
4.1 Who is the confirmation of ethical behavior for?
What constitutes an appropriate specification and verification methodol-
ogy for ethical behavior depends on who is to use the results. In the case
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of intelligent autonomous systems at least three interested parties can be
discerned: the designers including developers and engineers working on de-
veloping and maintaining the systems, the end-users, owners or customers,
and lastly various government and trade regulatory bodies and insurance
agents. Although these three categories are the evident interested parties,
this issue of interest discernment is an open problem in its own right, and as
some preliminary investigations show7 finer discernment may be required.
Although those actually constructing the AI system may have an inti-
mate knowledge of its internal workings, it is still important that developers
and engineers not only have confidence in their prototypes but have tech-
niques for highlighting where issues still remain. The technology itself should
not be a black box, but should be open to maintenance and analysis, and
must be flexible enough to be improved dynamically.
For end-users, customers and owners, the primary concern is that the
AI system they interact with is safe and behaves ethically with respect to
the ethical norms they themselves follow, as long as these are within the
scope of what is considered ethical and legal within their society. Trust is
a key issue and, in order to have trust extended to AI systems, the user
needs to be informed of its range of capabilities. The future of AI systems
and their proper integration within our society is subject, paradoxically, to
undue levels of both optimism and pessimism in terms of the extent to which
people can trust such systems. Close attention must be paid to nurturing
the appropriate level of trust.
AI systems are an exciting technological development that have long
been anticipated as part of the future in various works of fiction and there is
the temptation to play-up their apparent capabilities, particularly by early
marketing when the producers are still seeking financiers for their products.
This could lead to the customers placing an unwarranted level of trust in
some technology, even when adequate disclaimers and use guidelines are
outlined by the manufacturer, which can in turn lead to disastrous conse-
quences8. Such misplacement of trust is dangerous for users in the present,
and may cause society to over-react in order to limit integration of tech-
nologies which given proper time to adequately develop would have been
advantageous to the same society.
The appearance of trustworthiness is similarly an issue when people in-
teract with an AI system. For example, a robot might appear “experienced,”
7http://robohub.org/should-a-carebot-bring-an-alcoholic-a-drink-poll-
says-it-depends-on-who-owns-the-robot/
8https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/30/tesla-autopilot-
death-self-driving-car-elon-musk
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“benevolent,” or “sympathetic”. Such appearances are of particular concern
for AI systems that are integrated in assisted living technologies. Concerns
have been raised with respect to the impact assisted living technologies can
have on the elderly Sharkey and Sharkey [2012]. Similarly, it has been
shown that children who interact with robots derive expectations of them
and ascribe abilities to them. We need to develop an understanding of the
potential long-term effects of robots on child development Matthias [2015].
Trust should play a considerable role in choosing an ethical theory to
implement in AI systems. The ethical theory that is easiest to implement
may not necessarily be the one that is most trusted by society. This was
demonstrated in the case of utilitarianism and driver-less cars Bonnefon et
al. [2016].
It is important to note that trust Arkin et al. [2012] is not equal to ethics.
Trust is a social construct intimately concerned with how each individual
views the behavior of a robot or system. There may well be some varieties of
objective trustworthiness, but there will remain many varieties of subjective
trustworthiness. Many items affect users’ level of trust Salem et al. [2015],
for example, the relationship between trust and harm. If you could show
that robot causes no harm, would you trust it more?
Those who must regulate AI systems and their integration within society
also need confidence in the system. In addition, the Insurance industry
needs to be clear where responsibility Sombetzki [2015] lies and so where
liability lies. The concept of liability is likely to be complex and may be
split over several actors, such as the manufacturers/designers, the operators
and the environment. Regulation is crucial and first steps have been taken
to go beyond safety and reliability regulations Bryson and Winfield [2017];
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) [2014] into considering
the ethical aspects that should be taken into account British Standards
Institution (BSI) [2016].
Any system operating in the real world would eventually find itself in a
situation in which it will malfunction and AI systems are no exception. The
question is thus how certain can one be in the verified ethical behavior of
an AI system and what measures can be taken to mitigate the consequences
of, and learn from, a system’s potential failure. This is the issue of having
confidence in the system.
In terms of safety standards, the “gold standard” is currently that of air-
craft autopilot software where safety is measured as the number of accidents
per miles flown. We might think that, for AI systems, at least as much con-
fidence is needed. But, is the standard too high or even achievable? There
are of course, noticeable differences between aircraft and other autonomous
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systems. While the operational environment of an aircraft is very controlled
and limited, as the aircraft must adhere to a strictly defined flying corridor,
the severity of accidents is very high. E.g., any malfunction in the air is
certainly fatal for all of the aircraft passengers measuring in the hundreds,
whereas a miscalculation on the road does not need to be fatal since cars
carry fewer passengers than airplanes. It is possible that the hours of op-
eration per accident alone is not always the best measure to assess safety
of an autonomous system, but that the severity of the damage caused and
the number of individuals involved in an accident should also be taken into
account Patchett et al. [2015]; Kelly and McDermid [2001]; Denney and Pai
[2014]; Webster et al. [2014].
4.2 What do we want the system to do?
A key problem is specifying what our expectations of an AI system are. Al-
though this is beginning to be codified where safety is considered, for exam-
ple through robot safety standards9, it is less clear where the ethical/moral
requirements should come from and in what form should they be repre-
sented? The BS8611 standard British Standards Institution (BSI) [2016],
for example, does not prescribe what the ethical requirements should be,
but maps out the issues over which ethical decisions should be considered.
An obvious route for ethical and legal requirements is through regulatory
or standards bodies. These entities have the ability to set overall standards,
potentially with the help of domain experts. In addition, designers may well
have built in specific ethical codes that go beyond (though do not contra-
dict) those prescribed by regulations. Finally, the user herself may wish to
input her ethical preferences, ensuring that the AI acts in a way that is
personally acceptable. Since there are multiple actors that need to define
and refine the ethical requirements of the system, each with varying levels
of technical expertise, the issue arises of how the ethical requirements are
represented for the machine and for concerned actors. No one clear method-
ology emerges. One possibility is to have them represented in the form of
a set of legal or formal rules, as argued in Saptawijaya and Moniz Pereira
[2016]. Another possibility is to use a set of example scenarios developed to
test specific ethical choices, as in Anderson and Anderson [2014]. A third,
but by no means final, possibility is as a statistical envelope around a large
(and possibly random) set of test cases, against which the AI system must
be exhaustively assessed.
9See International Organization for Standardization (ISO) [2016] for a range or robotic
safety standards.
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4.3 How do we show that the AI systems meets the expec-
tations?
There is a well-established body of work tackling the Verification and Val-
idation (V&V) of systems, both hardware-centred and software-rich. The
aim of Verification is to ensure that a system meets its requirements; Formal
Verification takes this further, not only having precise formal requirements,
but carrying out a comprehensive mathematical analysis of the system to
‘prove’ whether it corresponds to these formal requirements. There are
many varieties of formal verification, the most popular being model check-
ing Clarke et al. [1999]; Armstrong et al. [2012], whereby formal require-
ments are checked (usually automatically) against all possible executions of
the system. Verification, via model checking, is widely used especially for
the analysis of the safety and reliability of robotic systems both in terms
of physical navigation Mitsch et al. [2013] and in terms of internal decision-
making Dennis et al. [2016a]. What is being verified is that the behaviour
of a particular system conforms to defined expectations. In terms of ethi-
cal/moral verification, it seems clear that if an AI system acts by following
mathematically specified rules, we can potentially formally verify its high-
level behavior. Only recently, however, has the use of formal verification for
ethical or moral issues begun to be addressed Dennis et al. [2016b, 2015].
A practical alternative to fully formal verification is to use sophisticated
coverage-driven analysis methods, appealing to Monte-Carlo techniques and
dynamic test refinement in order to systematically “cover” a wide range
of practical situations. Especially where real-world interactions and de-
vices are involved, testing is likely to be crucial. Indeed, testing for safety
and reliability of robotic systems is well-established Mossige et al. [2015].
Such model-based testing is a well-developed technology but, as we move to
more complex (ethical) issues sophisticated extensions may well be required.
Though such approaches are typically used before deployment, related tech-
niques provide a basis for run-time verification and compliance testing Rosu
and Havelund [2005]. Testing is not as exhaustive as formal proof, but can
cover many more scenarios.
Validation is the process of confirming that the final system has the
intended behavior once it is active in its target environment, and is often
concerned with satisfying external stakeholders. For example, does our sys-
tem match ethical standards or legal rules set by regulators? Does our
system perform acceptably from a customer point of view, and how well do
users feel that it works Lehmann et al. [2013]? There are many approaches
to carrying out validation, typically involving the assessment of accuracy,
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repeatability, trust, usability, resilience, etc. All must be extended to cope
with ethical and moral concerns.
It is clear that the strength and breadth of V&V research should allow
us to extend and develop this towards ethical and moral concerns. However,
a number of issues remain, as follows.
• If the core software is not purely rule-based, for example involving
some sub-symbolic learning procedures, then we will need a symbolic
representation of the learned content if we are to carry out formal
verification of the above form. One of the limitations of both formal
verification and testing is likely to be in verifying learning procedures,
especially where new ethical principles and preferences of behavior are
learned.
• Fully formal verification is likely to be unrealistic for complete, com-
plex systems both because of non-symbolic components (as mentioned
above) and because of practical complexity limits.
However, we can formally verify parts of the system under particular cir-
cumstances. There are things that can be proved about core parts of the
system and about the system’s outputs. Consequently, formal verification
techniques can provide some evidence. In assessing how much confidence we
need in the V&V of AI system ethics, it may be possible to leave the burden
of this decision to the regulator, manufacturer or end-user as appropriate.
So long as a clear indication of the extent of the V&V of a system exists
a user or other interested may take the decision about the risk involved
in using the system. Note that we can potentially separate regulation from
verification and so allow a variety of different V&V techniques to be applied.
Lastly, we would like to include here the existing efforts of validating a
system that uses soft AI methods, which is the discussion of Ethical Turing
Tests. Ethical Turing Tests were introduced in Allen et al. [2000]. In Ander-
son and Anderson [2014] this idea is further fleshed out and implemented.
Under an ethical Turing test, both the AI system and an ethicist resolve
the same dilemmas. The system passes the test if its choices are sufficiently
similar to the ones of the ethicist. Whether a variant of a Turing test is
a sufficient indicator of a certain type of “human-like” behaviour from a
machine is a topic that has been argued as long as the artificial intelligence
field exists. All the issues that have been raised, and exhaustively discussed
in artificial intelligence, against the Turing test original can be argued to
hold for an Ethical Turing test.
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5 Transparency and accountability
The opacity and transparency of deep neural network algorithms has be-
come a major research subject area in recent years. Without knowing how
the algorithm functions concerns about inherent biases in data and algo-
rithm itself create difficulties in either discerning forensically or through
explainability how decisions were made. Furthermore, there are questions
as to whether the actual logic used by learning systems can be explained to
people, or whether any explanation would be created after the fact.
The problem with interpretability/explainability is that in some cases
it may be impossible to provide a complete and accurate explanation for
how a black box system has arrived at its decision. As complexity of sys-
tems increases, it is not unusual for the algorithm to extract a million-
dimensional feature vector and assign unique weights to each feature. Any
human-readable explanation for the decision will include some top N most
important features and completely ignore the rest. A human-comprehensible
explanation cant be too long or too complex. A good metaphor for this is
how we explain things to children if they are not old enough to fully ap-
preciate nuances of the problem. Where do kids come from? You buy them
at the store! Any human-friendly explanation from a sufficiently complex
system has to be a partially inaccurate simplification or a complete lie.
The choice of the relevant criteria for an AI system to be deemed ethical
will eventually need to be taken by society as a whole. Therefore trans-
parency is of utmost importance and thus ensuring transparency is a major
challenge. To this end it is necessary to identify what has to be transparent
to whom, and how this can be realized.
Transparency is a key requirement for ethical machines. Important at-
tributes flow from transparency including trust, because it is hard to trust
a machine unless you have some understanding of what it is doing and why,
and accountability, because without transparency it becomes very difficult
to understand who is responsible when a machine does not behave as we
expect it to10. An ethical machine will need to be transparent to different
stakeholders in different ways – each suited to that particular stakeholder.
In this section we consider the transparency needs of a range of stakehold-
ers before considering aspects of transparency common to all. This section
outlines how and why transparency is important to four different groups
of stakeholders: users, regulators (including accident investigators), ethi-
cists/lawyers and society at large. Each group has different transparency
10Although it is important to note that transparency is not the same as accountability.
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needs, some of which will have to be met by allowing an AI system’s ethics,
and ethical logic, to be human readable, or through public engagement.
Other needs will require new human-robot interfaces.
Some literature exists on the topic of transparency in AI and autonomous
systems. Owotoki and Mayer-Lindenberg Owotoki and F. [2007] proposes a
theoretical framework for providing transparency in computational intelli-
gence (CI) in order to expose the underlying reasoning process of an agent
embodying CI models. In a recent book Taylor and Kelsey Taylor and Kelsey
[2016] make the case for the importance of transparency in AI systems to
an open society. For autonomous robots Wortham et al. [2016] describes
early results showing that building transparency into robot action-selection
can help users build a more accurate understanding of the robot. There is
also no doubt that transparency is high on policy agenda: the 2016 UK Par-
liamentary Select Committee on Science and Technology’s final report on
Robotics and AI expresses concerns over both decision making transparency
and accountability and liability11. Indeed the EU’s new General Data Pro-
tection Regulation, due to take effect as law in 2018, creates a “right to
explanation” such that a user will be able to ask for an explanation of an
algorithmic decision that was made about them Goodman and Flaxman
[2016].
5.1 Transparency to the user
Although the critical importance of the human-machine interface is well
understood, what is not yet clear is the extent to which an ethical machine’s
ethics should be transparent to its user. It would seem to be unwise to
rely on a user to discover a machine’s ethics by trial and error, but at the
same time a machine that requires its user to undergo a laborious process
of familiarisation may well be unworkable.
For care robots for instance it may be appropriate for the user to config-
ure the “ethics” settings (perhaps expressing the user’s preference for more
or less privacy) or, at the very least, allowing the user to choose between
a small number of “preset” ethics options. There is of course always some
danger that many users will rely on the default setting. What is clear is
that how these options are presented to the user is very important Matthias
[2015]; they should for instance help and guide the user in thinking about
their ‘value hierarchy’. The robot might for instance explain to the user
11http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmsctech/145/
145.pdf
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“what would happen” in different situations and hence guide their prefer-
ences Theodorou et al. [2016].
For other robot types, driverless cars for instance, the ethics settings may
be fixed (perhaps by law) and therefore not user configurable. However,
the need for the user to understand how the car would behave in certain
situations remains critically important – especially if the car’s design (or
the law) requires her to act as a safety driver and assume manual control
when the autopilot cannot cope. Even for fully autonomous cars in which
the user is only ever a passenger, the person with legal responsibility for the
car should be aware of the car’s ethics settings. For fully autonomous cars
there should still be some user interface so that the passenger can discover,
or perhaps ask for help, if the vehicle become unexpectedly immobile or
starts behaving erratically.
5.2 Transparency to regulatory bodies
It is clear that the ethics of ethical robots needs to be transparent to those
responsible for (i) certifying the safety of ethical machines, and (ii) accident
investigators. Both regulators and accident investigators will be working
within a governance framework which includes standards and protocols. The
role of the protocols is to set out how robots are certified against those
standards, and – following an accident – how the accident is investigated.
Regulators will need the ability to determine that a machine’s ethics
comply with the appropriate standards12, and making such a determination
will require those ethics to be coded and embedded into the robot in a
readable way. We might imagine something like a standard Ethics Markup
Language (EML – perhaps based on XML) which codes the ethics. The
EML script would be embedded in the robot in a way that is accessible
to the regulator, noting that the script will need to be secured to prevent
attack from hackers.
Accident Investigators. When serious accidents happen, as they in-
evitably will (see Section 4.1), they will need to be investigated. To al-
low such investigation, data must to be recorded, suggesting the need for a
robot equivalent of the flight data recorder. Therefore an Ethical Black
Box (EBB) is proposed Winfield and Jirotka [2017]– a device that records all
relevant data including, crucially, internal state data on the robot’s ethical
governor. Although the data stored by the EBB would be vital for investi-
gating all aspects of an accident, including causes unrelated to the robot’s
12Standards Which do not yet exist.
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ethics, here we are interested in accidents which might have been caused
by a fault or deficiency in the robot’s ethics programming. By recording
the sequence of internal states of the ethical reasoning in the moments be-
fore the accident, the EBB would allow an investigator to discover exactly
why the robot made an incorrect decision. Information that would be im-
portant both in determining accountability, and to make recommendations
for upgrading the robot’s ethics and prevent the same accident happening
again.
Specifying the EBB is beyond the scope of this paper, this work has
been carried further in Winfield and Jirotka [2017]. It is however clear
that research is needed to determine what data the EBB must record, the
frequency and time window of that data, and how the privacy of that data
is maintained. One thing we can be sure of however is the need for an
industry standard EBB (as in the aviation industry). Different EBBs and
EBB standards will of course be needed for different applications, but for
driverless cars for instance, a single standard EBB should be mandated.
Such an EBB would itself require an industry standard, and protocols for
certification, fitting and maintenance of EBBs.
5.3 Transparency to ethicists / lawyers
A third group of stakeholders includes lawyers, who might be required to
advocate for AI systems’ owners, or on behalf of anyone who makes a claim
against an AI system’s owner, or ethicists who might, for instance, be re-
quired to act as expert witnesses, in a court of law. If we consider an accident
in which a robot’s ethics are implicated (see Section 5.2 above), it is clear
that both lawyers and ethicists will need to understand (i) a robot’s ethics,
(ii) the process the robot uses to make an ethical decision (in other words
how its ethical reasoning works), and (iii) the data captured by the ethical
black box. Providing this kind of transparency to lawyers and ethicists will
not only be necessary, but is also likely to be challenging, as robot manufac-
turers and designers may regard such details, especially (ii), as proprietary
IP.
Another category of expert stakeholder includes psychologists, who might
be required to either evaluate robots for their potential to cause psycholog-
ical harm to the user, or as expert witnesses, in providing an investigation
with an expert evaluation of the psychological harm caused to robot user(s)
in a particular case.
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5.4 Transparency to the whole of society
AI systems – and especially ethical AI systems – are a disruptive technology,
with potentially significant societal and economic impact, thus an easily
overlooked but important stakeholder is society as a whole. We only need
to consider driverless cars and trucks to appreciate the level of potential
disruption, to jobs and transport policy for instance, as already reflected in
the level of public and press interest in this technology.
It is therefore very important that the ethics of ethical AI systems should
be transparent to society at large, for two reasons. First, because citizens
should be able to make informed judgments about the kinds of AI system
they wish to have in their lives, and even more importantly those they do not
want in their lives, so that they can lobby their elected representatives and
ensure that government policy properly reflects those views. And second,
if society is to have confidence in the ethics of a class of ethical AI system
(driverless cars, for example) then it should accept a degree of collective
responsibility for those ethics.
5.5 Technical means to bring about transparency
It is clear that the different stakeholders outlined above have very different
transparency needs. Some of those needs are met through making the ethical
rules and logic readable (for instance for regulators, ethicists or lawyers), but
for others transparency can only be met through technical means. Here we
briefly outline several approaches to meeting those needs.
• Assisted living AI systems would benefit from a “Why did you do
that?” button which, when pressed, causes the robot to explain –
perhaps using speech synthesized text – why it carried out the previous
action. We could call the system behind this an “explanation module”.
For an AI system with a fixed set of responses the explanation module
should be relatively easy to implement, but for an AI system which
learns its ethics such an implementation could be challenging; in either
case the explanation module and its user interface would need very
careful design in order to meet the needs of a non-technical user.
• An ethical AI system which makes use of simulation based internal
models as part of some ethical governor (for example Winfield et al.
[2014]) might allow us to go further than the “Why did you do that?”
button, by making the robot’s internal simulation accessible to the
user. This would enable the user to ask the robot “What would you
do?” in a given situation. Clearly such a facility would need a much
24
more sophisticated user interface than a button press, but through vi-
sualisation tools we can imagine the user watching the robot’s internal
simulation running through various scenarios on a connected laptop
or tablet device. Note that a similar visualisation interface would be
of great value to accident investigators (Section 5.2), and expert wit-
nesses or lawyers (section 5.3) to play back a robot’s internal simulation
in the moments leading up to an accident, and what the alternatives
open to the robot at the time might have been.
• The technical requirements for an ethical back box (EBB) were already
outlined in Section 5.2 above.
6 Dangerous and Deliberately Unethical AI
Finally, it is important to be aware of the ways people may abuse or manip-
ulate AI systems. As with all technology AI systems can also be deliberately
abused for malice or to further one’s illegal goals Yampolskiy [2016]. While
our primary concern is to contribute towards designing AI systems that be-
have ethically within a human society Sotala and Yampolskiy [2015]; Yam-
polskiy [2015a] and promote human and animal welfare, some concern also
needs to be raised about how that AI system can protect itself against abuse
Yampolskiy and Spellchecker [2016]. By abuse we, of course, do not mean
mistreating the AI system in the sense in which a person or an animal can
be mistreated, but taking advantage of the capabilities and opportunities
offered by the AI system to commit criminal acts.
The abuse of an AI system can be achieved by hacking an existing system
or by deliberately creating an unethical AI system Pistono and Yampolskiy
[2016]; Vanderelst and Winfield [2016]. Hacking itself can be accomplished
in several ways. The code of the AI system might be directly hacked. But a
system can also be manipulated by interaction and such manipulation does
not necessarily require technical knowledge. This is illustrated by the short-
lived Tay experiment. Tay was an artificial intelligence chatter-bot released
by Microsoft Corporation on March 23, 2016 and taken offline 16 hours after
launch13. Tay was programmed to learn from conversation, however it took
the netizens a very short time to “train” it into making morally questionable
statements.
Manipulation by interaction can be accomplished both deliberately and
by accident. A learning based system can be led Yampolskiy [2014] intro
eliciting bad conclusions through crafted case descriptions, etc. By this
13http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-35890188
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means one can slowly train systems away from moral behavior. As an ex-
ample of accidental manipulation consider the example of children learning
that driverless cars slow down in their presence, they might choose to make a
game out of it. Children playing with car’s reactions might annoy passengers
by causing delay; and might ultimately lead to the disabling of safeguards.
Purposeful creation of Malevolent AI can be attempted by a number of
diverse agents with varying degrees of competence and success. Each such
agent would bring its own goals/resources into the equation, but what is im-
portant to understand here is just how prevalent such attempts will be and
how numerous such agents can be. For example, we should be concerned
about: the military developing cyber-weapons and robot soldiers to achieve
dominance; governments attempting to use AI to establish hegemony, con-
trol people, or take down other governments; corporations trying to achieve
monopoly, destroying the competition through illegal means; villains trying
to take over the world and using AI as a dominance tool; black hats attempt-
ing to steal information, resources or destroy cyber infrastructure targets;
doomsday cults attempting to bring the end of the world by any means; the
depressed looking to commit suicide by AI; psychopaths trying to add their
name to history books in any way possible; criminals attempting to develop
proxy systems to avoid risk and responsibility; AI risk deniers attempting
to demonstrate that AI is not a risk factor and so ignoring caution; and even
AI safety researchers, if unethical, attempting to justify funding and secure
jobs by purposefully developing problematic AI.
The ethical and unethical behaviors of an AI system are not necessar-
ily symmetrical. Existing systems define only a small part of the problem
space Yampolskiy [2015b]. Apart from ethical and unethical behavior, an AI
system can also exhibit a behavior that has neither been programmed nor
predicted as a particular combination of otherwise ethical rules and choices.
Lastly we must mention the potential for “cultural imperialism” when
designing the ethical behavior of an AI system. With globalisation, a prod-
uct’s production and consumers are diverse. What constitutes ethical be-
havior in one region may even be considered unethical in another. All the
involved actors, the designers, users and society, both on the supplier and
on the demand end of the AI system need to be aware of the reality that
the supplier society ethics influences the ethical behavior of the AI system,
which in turn influences the ethics of the society in which the AI system
operates.
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7 Summary
Moral philosophy has a very rich history of studying how to discern right
from wrong in a systematic, consistent and coherent way. Today we have
a real need for a functional system of ethical reasoning as AI systems that
function as part of our society are ready to be deployed. Building an AI
system that behaves ethically is a multifaceted challenge. The questions of
which ethical theory should be used to govern the AI system’s behavior has
received most of the attention. Here, we focus on the problem that comes
next, after what is right or wrong for a machine to do is decided – how to
implement the ethical behavior.
The problem of engineering ethical behavior is made complex because
of the prime motivators for such behavior. For humans, the motivation
for behaving ethically is primarily internal. Without falling into difficult
philosophical arguments on the existence of free will, we accept that people
are capable of behaving ethically because they choose to do so, although,
of course, they too can be motivated towards ethical behaviour by incen-
tives, punishments and assignment of liability. For AI systems, however,
the motivation towards ethical behaviour is exclusively external because it
can always be traced back to their design and it cannot be reinforced in
the same way as it can be done with people. This motivation furhtermore
comes from several stakeholders. We cannot claim that the full list of these
stakeholders can even be known before the AI systems are fully deployed,
but we can discern between the three most evident groups of stakeholders:
the designers, the users and the various regulatory organs of society. Each
of these stakeholders needs to play their role in deciding what is the best
ethical behavior for a given AI system, but they also need to be convinced
in an adequate way that the implemented behavior actually yields the de-
sired results. A moral AI system needs to be adequately transparent and
accountable to each group of stakeholders.
Unlike people, who more or less share the same “hardware” and reasoning
capabilities, machines and AI systems can be built using many different
approaches. The implementation of ethical reasoning will depend not only
on what the stakeholders need and desire, but also on what is possible
given the chosen problem-solving implementation. We discussed the two
basic implementation approaches reflecting two large families of AI methods:
the soft AI and the symbolic AI families, and identify the challenges and
advantages of each.
An AI system capable of ethical behavior is necessarily a complex system.
With complex systems two things are evident: that they will malfunction
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and that they can be used to attain criminal goals. We discuss methods of
verifying that an AI system behaves as designed within specified parameters,
but we also discuss how the engineering of the ethical behavior impacts
available options once a system malfunctions. Lastly we discuss in broad
strokes what the stakeholders need to be aware of in terms of abuse of
an AI system with ethical behavior capabilities, both when that abuse is
intentional and accidental.
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